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Abstract 
The average capital adequacy of Czech banks increased from 14.1% in 2009 to 17.1% in 2013. In the case of Slovak banks the 
figure increased even more, from 12.7% at end-2009 to 17.2% at end-2013.  For the sample of the largest nine Czech and four 
Slovak banks we aim to identify the strategies that these banks adopted in order to increase their capital ratios. Our analysis 
shows that for Czech banks as with the large multi-national banks from advanced economies, increased capital has played a 
major role in increasing the average capital ratio. Slovak banks, in addition, significantly decreased their risk to strengthen the 
overall ratio. The results of our analysis are useful mainly from a regulatory point of view as in both the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia the countercyclical buffer is set to its minimum of 0% of risk-weighted assets and the national regulators may increase 
the buffer up to 2.5% in the medium or long term. 
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1. Introduction 
The financial crisis showed that not all banks had satisfactory capital levels. Moreover, some banks had capital of 
low quality, and so could not absorb the losses. Basel III reacts to both weaknesses. From 2014 it requires banks to 
hold substantially more capital of higher quality compared to Basel II.  
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Czech and Slovak banks started to react to the new Basel III regulatory framework promptly. As a result, as the 
Czech National Bank (ýNB, 2014b) and National Bank of Slovakia (NBS, 2014a) data shows, the average capital 
adequacy of Czech banks increased significantly from 14.1% at end-2009 to 17.1% at end-2013. The average capital 
adequacy of Slovak banks rose even more from 12.7% at end-2009 to 17.2% at end-2013. 
Using sample of the major nine Czech and four Slovak banks we aim to identify the strategy that banks adopted 
in order to increase their risk-weighted capital ratios from 2009 to 2013. We address the following questions: Have 
the Czech and Slovak banks increased their capital ratios by decreasing risk, increasing capital or both? If both, what 
has played the major role? How has the average portfolio risk changed?  
This paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the new capital requirements, section 3 summarizes related 
literature, section 4 introduces methodology and dataset and section 5 presents the results of an empirical analysis: 
how bank capital, portfolio risk and total assets interacted in increasing capital ratios. 
2. Capital Requirements under Basel III 
The primary focus of this study is the adjustment of banks to higher capital requirements, so we discuss the rules 
on quantity and quality of capital in more detail. According to the new definition (BIS, 2011), capital comprises two 
components: going-concern Tier 1 capital and gone-concern Tier 2 capital. Tier 1 capital consists of Common Equity 
Tier 1 (CET 1) capital and Additional Tier 1 Capital. 
CET 1 capital is the highest quality capital. Common shares and retained earnings must form the predominant 
part of CET 1. The quantity of minimum capital levels (compared to Basel II) is required as follows: 
 
• Minimum requirement for CET 1 capital is more than doubled from 2% to 4.5% of risk-weighted assets (RWA);   
• Minimum requirement for Tier 1 capital is increased from 4% to 6.0% of RWA; 
• Minimum total capital, which consists of Tier 1 and Tier 2, remains unchanged and totals 8% of RWA.  
  
The new capital ratios are calculated after a number of regulatory deductions and adjustments are made. This 
includes the deduction of goodwill, other intangibles or deferred tax assets from Tier 1.  
On top of changes in the structure of Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital, Basel III introduces two new buffers: a capital 
conservation buffer of 2.5% and a countercyclical buffer of 0%-2.5%. Both buffers need to be covered by the highest 
quality CET 1 capital. In both the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the countercyclical buffer is currently set to its 
minimum of 0% (ýNB 2014a, NBS 2014b) of risk-weighted assets and the national regulators may increase the 
buffer up to 2.5% in the medium or long term. Additional capital surcharges of up to 3.0% for systemically 
important financial institutions (SIFIs) are effective as well. The SIFI surcharge needs to be covered by CET 1 
capital.    
3. Literature review 
The literature on the channels of adjustment to the new Basel III requirements shows that capital ratios have 
increased since the financial crisis in 2008 for banks worldwide. For example, Cohen & Scatigna (2014) conclude 
that for a sample of 94 large banks from advanced and emerging economies, which cover 64% of the assets of the 
top 1,000 global banks, capital ratio increased from 11.4% at end-2009 to 13.9% at end-2012. During the same 
period, for a sample of top 16 US banks the ratio increased from 14.0% to 17.6% and for a sample of 35 large 
European banks the ratio rose from 12.1 % to 14.5% during the same period. Their analysis shows that retained 
earnings account for the bulk in increase in capital ratio with reductions in risk playing a lesser role.  
Cohen & Scatigna (2014) note that in recent years some observers have expressed concerns that if banks have to 
hold more capital, this will have a negative macroeconomic impact as the banks may pull back from lending to 
finance investment. As a response, a number of studies have evaluated the potential macroeconomic impact of Basel 
III. An analysis of the potential increase in lending spread and decrease of annual GDP growth rate was carried out 
by Oxford Economics (2013), Šútorová and Teplý (2013), Roger and Vlþek (2011), Slovík and Cournede (2011) or 
King (2010). The impact estimates of one percentage point increase in capital ratio on lending spread and on annual 
GDP growth rate differ even within the same region. For example, for the EU area Roger and Vlþek (2011) predict 
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that one percentage point increase in capital ratio leads to an increase of lending spread of 65 basis points while 
Šútorová and Teplý (2013) predict an increase of only 19 basis points. 
4. Methodology and Data 
4.1. Methodology 
In order to understand how banks have responded to tighter capital requirements, we analyze the changes in the 
risk-weighted capital ratio and distinguish the basic components. We follow the methodology presented by Cohen 
and Scatigna (2014). 
There are three factors that influence the change in capital ratio: change in capital, change in riskiness of portfolio 
(risk-weighted assets to total assets) and change in total assets. Equation 1 isolates the changes from time 0 and time 
1 as follows: 
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where CARi = capital adequacy ratio at time i,
 Ki = regulatory capital at time i,
 RWAi = risk-weighted assets at time i,
 TAi = total assets at time i.
   
In contrast to Cohen and Scatigna (2014), we do not focus our analysis on changes in common equity but our 
approach is more direct. We focus on changes in regulatory capital.  Regulatory capital is likely to be less than the 
capital reported on balance sheets because of the deduction for goodwill, other intangible assets, deferred tax assets 
and other items. 
In order to better understand the impact of different factors on percentage point change in the capital adequacy, it 
is helpful to transform the equation 1 so that different quantities can be expressed as additive components. To do 
this, we take logarithms of equation 1. 
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Then we multiply both sides of the equation 2 by a common factor, so the resulting equation is as follows: 
 
Where F, the normalization factor, equals: 
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We use the equations 3 and 4 to decompose the increase in capital ratio in section 5 so we show sources of 
changes in bank capital normalized to percentage points of risk-weighted assets. 
4.2. Data 
To get data on individual banks we use the Bankscope database. In order to analyze the adjustment strategy 
between December 2009 and December 2013 we exported the dataset of all Czech and Slovak banks that existed at 
the beginning and end of that period. We focused on major banks, hence only banks with total assets above 100 
billion CZK (at December 2009) were exported. Foreign bank branches are not included in the sample because they 
do not hold equity. 
The list of 9 major Czech and 4 Slovak banks with total assets of CZK 5,213 billion at end-2013 is the starting 
point for our analysis. 9 Czech banks account for 81% of total assets of the whole Czech banking sector and 4 
Slovak banks account for 63% of Slovak banking sector total assets. For the list of banks in the sample, their total 
assets at end-2013 and their capital adequacy ratios see table 1. 
      Table 1. List of banks in sample 
# Name Country 
Total Assets 
bil. CZK 
(2013) 
Capital 
Adequacy 
 (2013) 
Capital 
Adequacy 
(2009) 
Capital 
Adequacy 
change 
(2013-2009)  
        a b c = a-b 
1 ýSOB CZ Czech. Rep. 1,034.8 15.6% 15.0% 0.6% 
2 ýeská spoĜitelna Czech. Rep. 968.7 18.6% 12.2% 6.4% 
3 Komerþní banka Czech. Rep. 864.0 15.8% 14.1% 1.7% 
4 UniCredit Bank Czech. Rep. 464.6 15.4% 12.6% 2.8% 
5 Slovenská sporitel'Ėa Slovakia 321.0 25.2% 10.4% 14.8% 
6 VÚB Slovakia 317.1 16.8% 11.7% 5.0% 
7 Tatra Banka  Slovakia 259.8 16.6% 12.2% 4.4% 
8 Hypoteþní banka Czech. Rep. 213.9 33.8% 40.2% -6.4% 
9 Raiffeisenbank Czech. Rep. 197.0 13.7% 11.1% 2.6% 
10 ýSOB Slovakia Slovakia 172.4 14.1% 13.4% 0.7% 
11 ýeskomor. stav. spoĜ. Czech. Rep. 165.6 16.1% 15.7% 0.3% 
12 GE Money Bank Czech. Rep. 134.6 23.7% 19.1% 4.6% 
13 Stav. spoĜ. ýeské spoĜ. Czech. Rep. 99.2 13.4% 23.5% -10.1% 
  Total*   5,212.8 17.7% 14.6% 3.1% 
 Source: Bankscope, author’s calculations (Note: * Total for columns a,b,c = weighted average using end-2013 assets as weights.) 
  
Figure 1 shows the changes in risk-weighted capital ratios from end-2009 to end-2013 for Czech and Slovak 
banks included in our sample separately. The figures are shown in terms of weighted averages using end-2013 total 
assets as weights. 
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Source: Bankscope, author’s calculations  
Fig. 1. Change in sample banks´ capital ratios, end-2009 to end-2013 
The average capital adequacy of the Czech banks in the sample increased from 15.4% at end-2009 to 17.4% at 
end-2013. Figure 1 shows that Slovak banks had lower capital adequacy at end-2009 than Czech banks therefore 
they needed to boost their capital more. As a result, their capital ratios increased more, from 11.7% at end-2009 to 
18.8% at end-2013. We can conclude that Czech and Slovak banks were very well-capitalized at December 2013, 
their capital ratios were significantly higher than the required minimum 8% of risk-weighted assets. 
In the next section we attempt to answer the question in the title. Did the Czech and Slovak banks increase their 
capital ratios by decreasing risk, increasing capital or both? What played the major role? How did the average 
portfolio risk change? 
 
5. Empirical results 
For the purpose of analysis first we need to know the changes in regulatory capital, total assets and risk-weighted 
assets for both Czech and Slovak banks during the 2009 – 2013 period. All three elements influence the final capital 
ratio. Second, we need to calculate change in average risk. Average risk we define as the ratio of risk-weighted 
assets to total assets (RWA/TA).  Table 2 shows end-2009 and end-2013 values for total assets, risk-weighted assets 
and regulatory capital for Czech and Slovak banks included in our sample. Table 3 shows changes in total assets, 
regulatory capital and risk in relative terms. 
      Table 2. Bank capital and assets (in CZK billion), 2009-2013 
Country Count Total Assets (2013) 
RWA  
(2013) 
Regulatory 
capital (2013) 
Total Assets 
(2009) 
RWA 
 (2009) 
Regulatory 
capital (2009) 
Czech 9 4,143 1,920 335 3,445 1,776 258 
Slovak 4 1,070 572 104 957 670 79 
Source: Bankscope, author’s calculations (Note: weighted averages using end-2013 total assets as weights are shown.) 
 
      Table 3. Change in bank risk, capital and total assets, 2009-2013 
Country Count RWA/TA (2013) RWA/TA (2009) Change in Risk 
Change in 
Regulatory 
Capital 
Change in Total 
Assets 
    a b c=a/b -1   
Czech 9 0.46 0.52 -10.0% 28.5% 23.1% 
Slovak 4 0.53 0.70 -23.8% 34.7% 12.2% 
Source: Bankscope, author’s calculations (Note: weighted averages using end-2013 total assets as weights are shown.) 
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Table 2 and 3 show three important findings. Firstly, both Czech and Slovak banks enjoyed high growth of total 
assets during the 2009 – 2013 period. Slovak banks enjoyed growth of 12.2% and Czech banks growth of 23.1%. 
Increase in total assets has a negative impact on capital adequacy ratio as more assets (with non-zero risk weight) 
bind more capital.  
Secondly, regulatory capital grew in both Czech and Slovak banks. Capital increase in both countries was similar. 
Slovak banks increased their capital levels by 34.7% and Czech banks by 28.5%, as shown in table 3. Increase in 
capital has a positive effect on regulatory capital ratios.  
Finally, a rather surprising finding: both Czech and Slovak banks lowered their average risk. In Czech banks the 
average risk decreased from 0.52 in 2009 to 0.46 in 2013, hence, the average risk was about 10% lower in 2013 than 
four years earlier. The decrease in risk was even more noticeable in Slovak banks. The average risk decreased from 
0.70 in 2009 to 0.53 in 2013 which totals 23.8% decrease in risk. Decrease in risk has a major positive effect in 
capital adequacy ratio. However, table 3 shows that the average risk of Slovak banks was higher than in Czech 
banks. Average risk of the Slovak savings banks totaled 0.53 at end-2013 while for the Czech banks the figure 
amounted to 0.46.  
These results suggest that major Czech and Slovak banks shifted their assets to classes with lower risk weights. 
On the other hand, it may also indicate, as BIS (2014) warns on a global level, that something more than a genuine 
reduction in assets’ riskiness has been at play. There is a risk that since the financial crisis banks might have 
redesigned their risk models in order to lower capital requirements by underestimating risk and providing optimistic 
asset valuations. This concern would be intensified if we observed that risk weights for similar assets varied 
substantially across banks. 
In order to better understand the impact of different factors on risk-weighted capital ratios, we use equation 3 to 
express different components of capital adequacy change as additive factors. Calculating elements of equation 3 
gives us the results presented in table 4. 
      Table 4. Sources of changes in bank capital ratios (in %, normalized to percentage points of risk-weighted assets), 2009-2013 
Country Count 
Capital 
adequacy 
(2013) 
Capital 
adequacy 
(2009) 
Change in 
capital 
adequacy 
Change in 
Regulatory 
Capital 
Change in 
Risk 
Change in 
Total Assets 
  a b 
c = a-b 
 = d+e+f d e f 
Czech 9 17.4% 15.4% 2.0% 3.7% 1.5% -3.2% 
Slovak 4 18.8% 11.7% 7.1% 4.3% 4.4% -1.6% 
Source: Bankscope, author’s calculations (Note: weighted averages using end-2013 total assets as weights are shown.) 
 
Table 4  shows how  the change in capital adequacy from 15.4% at end-2009 to 17.4% at end-2013 (see ‘Czech’ 
banks row), which represents an increase of 2.0 percentage points, can be broken down as follows: roughly 3.7 
percentage points of the overall increase reflected higher capital; an additional increase of 1.5 percentage points 
resulted from a decline in risk-weighted assets. These two positive effects, totaling 5.2 points, were counteracted by 
the rise in total assets, less the equivalent of 3.2 percentage points from the ratio which gives us the final 2.0 
percentage points of capital adequacy change.   
Table 4 confirms our previous conclusions. The increase in reported risk-weighted capital ratios largely resulted 
from higher capital held by Czech and Slovak banks. However, decrease in risk played an important role as well, 
especially in Slovak banks. While the shift to assets with lower risk weights played a secondary role in Czech banks 
(only 1.5 percentage point), this strategy played an equal role to capital increase strategy in Slovak banks for which 
4.3 percentage points of the overall increase reflected higher capital and 4.4 percentage points resulted from a 
decline in risk-weighted assets.  
Increase in overall ratios was slowed down because both Czech and Slovak banks enjoyed high asset growth. 
Figure 2 is a graphic illustration of the results presented in table 4. 
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Source: Bankscope, author’s calculations  
Fig. 2. Sources of changes in bank capital ratios, 2009-2013 
Figure 2 graphically shows that in Czech banks boosting capital was a major source and decrease in risk was a 
minor source of the final 2.0 percentage point increase in capital ratio. The figure illustrates that increase in capital 
ratios of Slovak banks (by 7.1 percentage points) resulted equally from lower risk and higher capital. The figure also 
illustrates that Slovak banks decreased their risk more than Czech banks.  
Our conclusions are in line with the Cohen and Scatigna (2014) study of large-international banks. The authors 
conclude that advanced-economy banks, globally systemically important banks (G-SIBs), advanced-economy non-
G-SIBs, US banks, European banks, and banks from other advanced economies, on the whole achieved most of their 
adjustment in recent years through increase in capital as a major channel of adjustment to stricter Basel III rules. 
Many of the global banks decreased their risk as well, especially US banks and advanced-economy non-G-SIBs. 
6. Conclusions 
The Czech and Slovak banking sector has made progress in adjusting to the new Basel III regulatory 
environment. Both Czech and Slovak banks increased their average regulatory capital ratios significantly during 
2009 – 2013 period.   
Our analysis shows that for Czech banks increased capital accounts for the bulk in increase in capital ratios with 
reductions in risk playing a lesser role.  A comparison of our results with other studies, suggests that the behavior of 
Czech banks is similar to large multi-national banks from advanced economies.  
In Slovak banks increase in capital played the same role as decrease in risk. Slovak banks decreased their risk 
significantly, more than Czech banks and as a result, both strategies were of equal importance.  
Further research is needed to evaluate whether the decline in average risk weight in bank portfolios assets was a 
result of bank management business decisions as a response to the financial crisis (this would have a major impact 
on bank clients, their investment and macro-economy) or whether it was only a natural outcome of the weakening 
demand for loans, where the macroeconomic impact is lower; or, finally, whether it was an outcome of redesigned 
risk models with the aim of lowering capital requirements. 
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